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ABSTRACT
The continuously rising Internet attacks pose severe challenges to develop an effective Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) to detect known and unknown malicious attack. In order to address the problem of detecting 
known, unknown attacks and identify an attack grouped, the authors provide a new multi stage rules for de-
tecting anomalies in multi-stage rules. The authors used the RIPPER for rule generation, which is capable 
to create rule sets more quickly and can determine the attack types with smaller numbers of rules. These 
rules would be efficient to apply for Signature Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) and Anomaly Intrusion 
Detection System (AIDS).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion detection is the method of recogniz-
ing user activities that may possibly steered 
a computer system from a secured state to an 
unsecure state. Since the quantity of attacks 
against computer systems increases regularly, 
it is very important for IDS to be effective; that 
is means, it should detect known and unknown 
attacks with minimum false alarms. However, 
Most of the IDS designed have problem in ef-
ficiently detecting all the attacks attempts and 
need a quantity of computational overhead, 
making it challenging to create real-time IDS.
There are two approaches to analysing 
events using IDSs. These are Signature based 
Intrusion Detection Systems (SIDS) and 
Anomaly based Intrusion Detection Systems 
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(AIDS) .At an earlier time of intrusion detection 
techniques mostly rely on signatures patterns 
of well-known Malware and take decisions by 
match up to signatures. This style of detection 
strategy is usually known as (SIDS). Never-
theless, it is very hard for SIDS to detect zero 
attack with unidentified signatures (Alazab, 
Abawajy, & Hobbs, 2013; Alazab, Alazab, 
Abawajy, & Hobbs, 2011). AIDS use a model 
of the normal system behavior and try to find 
important features from this model in the data 
achieved through the real behavior of the sys-
tem (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). However, 
(AIDS) has attracted the interest of many 
researchers to overcome the disadvantage of 
SIDS. AIDS detects users’ activities that are not 
the usual behaviour on a computer network. Ac-
cording to this approach, the assumption is that 
attacker behaviour deviates from normal user 
behaviour. Thus, AIDS involves the training 
stage and a testing stage. In the training stage, 
the normal traffic profile is labelled by using 
data that is accepted as normal behaviour; in the 
latter, the testing stage is applied to new data 
set. The result from this, the AIDS have abil-
ity to monitors the activities of new users and 
compares the new data with the obtained profile 
and tries to detect deviations. Those different 
from normal behaviour are considered as attacks 
(Alazab, Hobbs, Abawajy, & Alazab, 2012).
AIDS is categorized into many sub-kinds in 
the literature such as statistical techniques, data 
mining, artificial neural networks, and genetic 
algorithms and so on. The main benefit of an 
anomaly-based scheme is the power to detect 
zero days Malware. The reason for that, the 
AIDS does not depend on signatures database. 
It is used a model describing the normal user 
behavior, and any abnormal behavior that devi-
ates from the model is identified. Thus, AIDS 
has many advantages. First, they have the ability 
to find insider attacks. Second, the AIDS relies 
on the users profiles. Thus it is extremely hard 
for an attacker to identify what the normal user 
activity without generation an alarm (Patcha & 
Park, 2007). The reason for that the AIDS uses 
machine learning techniques in order to build 
user profiles. Unfortunately, making a user 
profiles is a challenging task because AIDS 
looking for unusual activity rather than actual 
malicious (Patcha & Park, 2007).
As discussed above Independent approach 
for (AIDS) and (SIDS) will not be as effective 
as collaborative approach to detect known and 
unknown attacks at the same time. As Intrusive 
activity does not match with anomalous activity 
every time. Though, there are five probabilities 
as shown in Figure 1. To address this problem, 
we present a Multi stage Rules to create robust 
model, which can reveal behaviors of attackers. 
The central idea is to apply sequential multi 
stage rules to learn rules that accurately capture 
the behavior of intrusions and normal activities. 
If user activity instance doesn’t satisfy any of 
the normal profile rules, then it is considered 
as new attack .These rules can then be applied 
for signature detection and anomaly detection. 
Our approach can give an accurate boundary 
between normal activities and intrusion.
Figure 1. Probability to identify the intrusion and normal
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The rest of the article is organized as 
follows: Section 2 discusses related research. 
Section 3 briefly describes our approach and 
discusses how they can be applied to gener-
ate intrusion and normal rules, which are the 
basis for creating misuse detection models and 
anomaly detection models. Sections 4 and 5 
report the results of our experiments on building 
intrusion detection approach. Section 6 provides 
the conclusion.
2. RELATED WORK
Intrusion detection systems have been ap-
proached by several machine learning methods. 
There has been a lot of work done in intrusion 
detection system. For example R. Islam and J. 
Abawajy have presented multi-tier classifica-
tion model for phishing email filtering (Islam 
& Abawajy, 2013). Mathew et al. (2006) have 
proposed a method to know multistage attacks 
using attack track based visualization of het-
erogeneous event streams. They have employed 
event correlation to determine the multistage 
attack, but event correlation reflects every hap-
pened event to obtain the relation between the 
alerts, which is occasionally not successful due 
to false detection by IDS.
A number of machine learning-based struc-
tures have been used to A-NIDS. Some of the 
most significant are explained below, and their 
main capability and problem are explained.
• Bayesian Networks (BN): A Bayesian net-
work is applied to model a domain having 
uncertainty. They have been widely used in 
AIDSs in deferent approach; for instance, 
(Kruegel, Mutz, Robertson, & Valeur, 
2003)developed an AIDS that employed 
Naive Bayes, These models return an 
anomaly score or a probability value that 
represent the ‘normality’ of this event as 
stated by their current profiles.
• Genetic Algorithms (GA): has been 
employed in diverse ways in IDSs. The 
Applied Research Laboratories of the 
University of Texas at Austin (Sinclair, 
Pierce, & Matzner, 1999) uses several 
machine learning methods, for example 
finite state machine, decision tree, and GA, 
to produce artificial intelligence rules for 
IDS, Whereas others have used Genetic 
Algorithms for feature selection.
• Artificial Neural Network (ANN): ANN 
is a purely inspired method of distributed 
computation. It is comprised of component 
processing units, and connections between 
them. Tong et al. (2009) have presented 
hybrid neural network to differentiate 
normal behaviors from abnormal behaviors 
by the profile of “software behavior”. Also, 
Wang, Hao, Ma, and Huang (2010) used 
ANN-based IDS and fuzzy clustering to 
enhance the detection precision for low-
frequent attacks and detection stability.
3. CLASSIFICATION 
ALGORITHMS
Intrusion detection can be treated as a classi-
fication problem; we want to categorize every 
record into set of potential groups, normal or 
a specific class of intrusion. However, The 
performance of IDS model will be depend on 
a classification model, that can be predict new 
coming data as belonging to the normal class 
or the attack class as shown in Figure 2.
In this section, we describe our approach 
and show how to we apply out approach to 
generate several rules.
3.1. Multi Stage Rules Detection
Our central idea is depends on the combination 
of SIDS and AIDS to generate accurate rules 
based on our assumption as shown on Table 1.
The SIDS and AIDS Model are combined 
by a Decision tree based classifier at first stage. 
It separates out normal traffic from attack traffic 
(containing both known and unknown attack). 
The generation attack rules are placed at second 
stage. The abnormal traffic is sent to the stage 
two and stage three to be classified into different 
categories as shown in Figure 3.
Based on the above table we can generate 
the following rules: 
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Figure 2. Anomaly detection systems
Figure 3. Multi-stage rules for anomaly detection
Table 1. Rules generations 
SIDS AIDS Rules
Attack Attack1, Attack2… Attack1, Attack2…
Attack Normal Attack
Normal Attack Attack1, Attack2…
Normal Normal Normal
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1. If SIDS is Attack and AIDS is Attack, then 
it is Attack
2. If SIDS is Attack is and AIDS is Normal, 
then it is Attack
3. If SIDS is Normal and AIDS is Attack, 
then it is Attack
4. If SIDS is Normal and AIDS is Normal, 
then it is Normal
In order to apply our techniques for rule 
generation, our approaches beginning from 
a simple equality decision tree matching for 
corresponding anomalous behavior; this stage 
is called SIDS or stage 1. This is can be done 
by determines the general features of attack 
characteristics, as well as specifics normal char-
acteristics which distinguish the general attack 
as shown in Figure 3 . At each stage group attack 
category is being separated from the normal 
behavior or different attack. On the first stage 
all suspicious behavior are being separated 
from the normal data. Later, the created features 
have high information gain because their value 
ranges can isolate anomalies record from the 
normal records. In this stage, classifier C4.5 
(J48) [14] is being selected as the decision tree 
algorithm. We have applied Weka’s J48 algo-
rithm, the Weka’s version of C4.5, with default 
parameters [15]. J48 is an optimized execution 
of C4.5. Decision trees provide popular and 
powerful models for machine learning. Some 
of the significant features of decision trees have 
the following: they are basically reasonable and 
intuitive; they produced graphical model as well 
as a set of rules; they are typically reasonable 
with more costly methods; decision trees are 
generally robust and scalable; they can handle 
distinct and continuous data; decision trees can 
be used to datasets containing a huge amount 
of data; their inference process, similarly to 
their induction, requires low computational 
cost (Polat & Güneş, 2009).
C4 5 belongs to a sequence of decision 
tree learners that trace their source back to 
the research of Hunt and others in the late 
1950s and early 1960s (Hunt, 1962). C4.5 use 
information gain to decide which variable to 
split (Liu, Chawla, Cieslak, & Chawla, 2010). 
The information gain from splitting a node t 
is defined as:
InfoGain Entropy
split
=
( ) ( )t
ni
n
Entropy i−∑
Where i  represents one of the sub-nodes 
after splitting (assume there are 2 sub-nodes), 
ni is the number of instances in subnote i, and 
n stands for the total number of instances. In 
binary-class classification, the entropy of node 
t is defined as:
Entropy t
j
t
j
tj
p( ) = −
=
∑
1 2,
log
Where j is represents one of the two classes.
On the second stage defines the similar 
rule of same attack group and at the same time 
brings about the general features of rest of the 
other attacks which distinguish the rest from 
that attack. These rules are created by using 
RIPPER algorithm (Cohen & Singer, 1999), 
which was introduced by Cohen and considered 
to be one of the most frequently implement 
rule-based algorithms in practice. Also, the 
rules for attack profile are defined and test 
traffic is tested against them. If data instance 
doesn’t satisfy any of the normal profile rules, 
then it is considered as new attack as shown in 
Figure 3 on stage 2.
Our approach uses rule learning classifica-
tion, where rules are created for each stage in 
classification. These classifiers select strong 
rules among each attack.
3.2. The Ripper Classifier
RIPPER [19], is a classification rule learn-
ing program, an extended version of learning 
algorithm IREP (Incremental Reduced Error 
Pruning). Beforehand creating a rule, the current 
set of training set is divide into two subsets, a 
growing set (usually 2/3) and a pruning set (usu-
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ally 1/3). The rule is generated from growing 
set. And then, the rule set starts with an empty 
rule set and rules are more rules are added to 
grouping list until no negative examples are 
covered. Once rules are increasing from the 
collection set, condition is removed from the 
rule in order to increase the efficiency of the 
rule set on the pruning examples. To reduce a 
rule, RIPPER considers only a last sequence 
of conditions from the rule, and chooses the 
deletion that maximizes the function.
4. EXPERIMENT AND 
ANALYSIS PERFORMANCE
4.1. Intrusion Detection Dataset
The experiment was performed on the NSL-
KDD data set which was proposed to solve 
some issues in the KDD Cup’99 data set that 
is commonly used for IDS evaluation [20][3]. 
This data set contains less number of records 
in both the train and the test, which aids re-
searchers to execute their experiments on the 
whole, sets instead of only small portions. 
The NSL-KDD intrusion detection benchmark 
consists of categories of attacks representing 
generalizations of specific attack types [21]. 
These main categories represent classifica-
tions of types of behavior that can be grouped 
logically together. So, for each category, there 
are multiple attack types, Table 2 shows attack 
categories shows these attack categories along 
with the 22 attack types.
In addition, each attack category (U2R, 
R2L, DoS, or Probing) is composed of a given 
Some of these attacks are known (For example, 
U2R is composed of eight attacks buffer over-
flow, httptunnel, loadmodule). In the KDD99 
data set, each data record corresponds to the 
features of a connection in the network data flow 
as shown in Table 3. Each connection is labeled 
either as normal or as an attack, with exactly 
one specific attack type. The data records are 
all labeled with one of the following five types:
• Denials-of Service (DoS): The attacker 
try to make the computer service unavail-
able. An attacker send many packet to the 
victim such as (. apache, smurf, Neptune, 
Ping of death, back, mail bomb, udpstorm, 
SYNflood, etc.).
• Probing or surveillance attacks have the 
goal of gaining knowledge of the existence 
or configuration of a computer system 
or network. Port Scans or sweeping of a 
given IP-address range typically fall in 
this category such as (mscan, saint, port 
sweep, nmap)
• User-to-Root (U2R) attacker access to a 
user data on the computer system.
• Remote-to-Local (R2L) attackers send 
malicious string to a victim over the 
network, the attacker to expose the client 
vulnerabilities and exploit privileges which 
a local user would have on the computer 
(e.g. xclock, dictionary, guest
4.2. Performance Evaluation
The effectiveness of IDS is assessed by its abil-
ity to create right predictions. According to the 
real nature of a given event contrasted to the 
prediction from the IDS, four potential results 
Table 2. Attack categories 
Attack type Attack pattern
Probe Ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan, mscan, saint
Dos back, land, neptune, pod, smurf, teardrop, apache2, mailbomb, processtable, udpstorm
U2R Buffer_overflow, loadmodule, perl, rootkit, ps, sqlattack
R2L ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, multihop, phf, spy, warezclient, warezmaster, xlook, xsnoop, snmp-
guess, worm
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are shown in Table 4, known as the confusion 
matrix. False Negatives: An activity is attack 
but it is not identified as normal. This is false 
negative because the intrusion detection system 
fails to detect the activity attack; false positives 
an activity is normal but it is identified as an 
attack; true negatives an activity is an attack 
and it is identified as attack; true positives an 
activity is normal and is identified as normal.
Based on the confusion matrix, a math-
ematical evaluation can apply the following 
measures to measure the performance of IDSs:
• True Positive (TP): Number of correctly 
identified malicious code.
• True Negative (TN): Number of correctly 
identified benign code.
• False Positive (FP): Number of wrongly 
identified benign code, when a detector 
identifies benign file as a Malware.
• False Negative (FN): Number of wrongly 
identified malicious code, when a detector 
fails to detect the Malware because the virus 
is new and no signature is yet available.
• Detection Rate (DR): The number of cor-
rectly classified positive examples divided 
by the total number of examples that are 
classified as positive, according the fol-
lowing equation
•  DR
TP
TP FP
=
+
• Precision of a classifier is the proportion of 
positive predictions made by the classifier 
that are true.
Accuracy
TN TP
TN TP FN FP
=
+
+ + +
• Recall is the percentage of correct positive 
that are truly detected by the classifier.
Table 3. Dataset features 
Label Network 
data feature
Label Network 
data feature
Label Network 
data feature
Label Network 
data feature
A duration L Logged in W count AH dst_host_same_srv_rate
B protocol-type M num_comprised X srv_count AI dst_host_diff_srv_rate
C service N root_shell Y serror_rate AJ dst_host_same_src_port_rate
D flag O Stu attempted Z srv_serror_rate AK dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate
E src_bytes P num_root AA rerror_rate AL dst_host_serror_rate
F dst_bytes Q Num of file AB srv_rerror_rate AM dst_host_srv_serror_rate
G land R Number of shell AC same_srv_rate AN dst_host_rerror_rate
H wrong_fragment S num_access_files AD diff_srv_rate AO dst_host_srv_rerror_rate
I urgent T num_outbound_cmds AE srv_diff_host_rate
J hot U Is host login AF dst_host_count
K num_falied_logins V Is guest login AG dst_host_srv_count
Table 4. Confusion matrix 
Predicated Class
Actual Class Normal Attack
Normal True positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Attack False Negative (FN) True negative (TN)
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• F-measure is defined as the harmonic mean 
of recall and precision according the fol-
lowing equation
F-measure =
+
2 * Re * Pr
Re Pr
call ecision
call ecision
In Table 5 shown confusion matrix, the 
element Xij i j          1 5 1 5≤ ≤ ≤ ≤( ), denotes 
the number of records that belong to class    i  
and were classified as class j by IDSs. Therefore, 
based on the confusion matrix, we can easily 
compute other performance criteria such as the 
detection rate of class i:
DR i
Xii
Xij
i
( )=
=∑ 1
5
And the false alarm rate of IDSs can be com-
puted by F i =
Xii
Xij
i
( ) 1
1
5
−
=∑
5. DETECTION RESULTS
The proposed multi stage rules approach is 
being conducted to evaluate NSL-KDD Data 
Set. Separating one class at a time is described 
below stages:
5.1. First Stage
In the beginning learn a model using two classes 
- anomaly class and normal class. The objective 
for this stage is differentiates anomaly class from 
a normal traffic. We report the performance of 
our detection models as Table 6 and Table 7.
5.2. Second Stage
This stage it learns from anomaly activities. We 
have chosen to use RIPPER rules. In order to 
evaluate this stage, we set intrusions to gather 
into a number of small clusters as shown in 
Table 2. Once the normal are separated, the 
Dos, Probe, U2R and R2L attacks are trained. 
Each attacks categories have rules for effective 
detection. The details of accuracy and number 
of rules over all four intrusion groups are shown 
in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11.
Table 6. Detailed accuracy by stage 1 classifier 
Class TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure ROC Area
normal 0.996 0.004 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998
anomaly 0.996 0.004 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.998
Avg 0.996 0.004 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.998
Table 5. Confusion matrix of IDSS 
Normal Probe U2R R2L DoS
Normal X11 X12 X13 X14 X15
Probe X21 X22 X23 X24 X25
U2R X31 X32 X33 X34 X35
R2L X41 X42 X43 X44 X45
DoS X51 X52 X53 X54 X55
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Table 10 shows generation RIPPER rules 
from stage 2 for identify all variety of intrusions. 
Can be integrated into misuse detection systems
5.3. Third Stage 3
For Stage three anomaly detection, instead of 
training the all data set, the data set can be first 
classified based on attack categories. In this 
stage we can identify all attacks and with details 
rules for each attack. The details of accuracy 
and number of rules over all four intrusion 
groups are shown in Table 12, Table 13, Table 
14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, 
Table 19, Table 20, Table 21, Table 22, Table 
23, Table 24, Table 25, and Table 26.
5.3.1. DOS Attack
Presented in Table 12, Table 13, Table 14, and 
Table 15
Table 7. Confusion matrix by stage 1 classifier 
Normal Anomaly
Normal 13389 60
Anomaly 51 11692
Table 8. Detailed accuracy by stage 2 classifier 
Class TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure ROC Area
DoS 0.997 0.005 0.996 0.997 0.997 0.997
Pobing 0.989 0.002 0.993 0.989 0.991 0.996
U2R 0.984 0.003 0.98 0.984 0.982 0.998
R2L 0.975 0.003 0.978 0.975 0.976 0.994
Avg. 0.992 0.004 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.997
Table 9. Confusion matrix by stage 2 classifier 
DoS Probing U2R R2L
DoS 7438 14 0 6
Pobing 14 2394 5 8
U2R 3 0 1408 20
R2L 10 4 24 1485
Table 10. Detailed accuracy by stage 2 classifier 
Number of Rules 27
Correctly Classified Instances 99.1584%
Incorrectly Classified Instances 0.8416%
Time taken to build model 0.38 seconds
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Table 11. RIPPER rules from stage 2 classifier 
   (F >= 93) and (F <= 237) and (B = tcp) and (AC >= 1) and (E >= 25) => Class=U2R (1182.0/1.0) (W <= 2) and (C = other) and (AJ <= 
0.02) and (B = tcp) => Class=U2R (125.0/0.0) 
   (F >= 46) and (C = pop_3) => Class=U2R 
   ………………………………………………..
Table 12. Detailed accuracy for DOS attack 
Number of Rules 11
Correctly Classified Instances 99.93%
Incorrectly Classified Instances 0.07%
Time taken to build model 0.64 seconds
Table 13. Detailed accuracy for DOS attack 
TP FP Precision Recall FMeasure ROC Area Class
1 0 1 1 1 1 neptune
1 0 0.997 1 0.998 1 smurf
0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 0.999 apache2
1 0 1 1 1 1 back
1 0 1 1 1 1 processtable
0.951 0 1 0.951 0.975 1 pod
1 0 1 1 1 1 mailbomb
1 0 0.857 1 0.923 1 teardrop
1 0 1 1 1 1 land
0 0 0 0 0 1 udpstorm
0.999 0 0.999 0.999 0.999 1 Avg
Table 14. Confusion matrix for DOS attack 
a b c d e f g h i j <-- classified
4657 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a = neptune
0 665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 b = smurf
1 0 736 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 c = apache2
0 0 0 359 0 0 0 0 0 0 d = back
0 0 0 0 685 0 0 0 0 0 e = processtable
0 2 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 f = pod
0 0 0 0 0 0 293 0 0 0 g = mailbomb
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 h = teardrop
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 i = land
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 j = udpstorm
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5.3.2. Probing
Presented in Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, and 
Table 19
5.3.3 R2L
Presented in Table 20, Table 21, and Table 22.
5.3.4 U2R
Presented in Table 23, Table 24, Table 25,and 
Table 26
In the above results, we have reported the 
performance of our approach. It is obvious from 
Figure 4 and Figure 5, our approach is faster 
in terms a number of rules and time taken to 
build the model.
Table 15. RIPPER rules for DOS 
(B = udp) and (E <= 0) => AP=udpstorm (2.0/0.0) 
(G >= 1) => AP=land (7.0/0.0) 
(B = udp) => AP=teardrop (12.0/0.0) 
(H >= 1) => AP=pod (36.0/0.0) 
………………………………………………..
Table 16. Detailed accuracy for probing 
Number of Rules 19
Correctly Classified Instances 95.6216%
Incorrectly Classified Instances 4.3784%
Time taken to build model 0.34 seconds
Table 17. RIPPER rules for probing 
(D = SH) => AP=nmap (73.0/0.0) 
(AK >= 0.5) and (B = icmp) => AP=ipsweep (137.0/0.0) 
(B = icmp) and (E <= 18) => AP=ipsweep (4.0/0.0) 
………………………………………………..
Table 18. Detailed accuracy for probing 
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F- Measure ROCArea
0.884 0.028 0.827 0.884 0.855 0.955 saint
0.991 0.008 0.989 0.991 0.99 0.994 mscan
0.927 0.018 0.956 0.927 0.941 0.983 satan
1 0 1 1 1 1 nmap
0.986 0.001 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.996 ipsweep
0.975 0.001 0.981 0.975 0.978 0.988 portsweep
0.956 0.013 0.957 0.956 0.957 0.986 Avg
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Table 19. Confusion matrix for probing 
a b c d e f <-- classified as
282 9 25 0 1 2 a = saint
5 987 3 0 1 0 b = mscan
52 1 681 0 0 1 c = satan
0 0 0 73 0 0 d = nmap
2 0 0 0 139 0 e = ipsweep
0 1 3 0 0 153 f = portsweep
Table 20. Detailed accuracy for R2L 
Number of Rules 17
Correctly Classified Instances 96.5857%
Incorrectly Classified Instances 3.4143%
Time taken to build model 0.21 seconds
Table 21. Detailed accuracy for R2L 
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall F_
Measure
ROC Area Class
0.996 0.054 0.968 0.996 0.982 0.975 warezmaster
0.983 0.001 0.989 0.983 0.986 0.996 snmpgetattack
0.994 0.001 0.997 0.994 0.995 0.999 snmpguess
0.444 0.005 0.533 0.444 0.485 0.709 multihop
0.294 0.003 0.5 0.294 0.37 0.847 named
0.786 0.002 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.879 sendmail
0 0 0 0 0 0.431 worm
0.333 0.002 0.5 0.333 0.4 0.67 xlock
0 0 0 0 0 0.613 xsnoop
0 0 0 0 0 0.443 ftp_write
0 0 0 0 0 0.213 imap
0 0 0 0 0 0.745 phf
0.966 0.034 0.954 0.966 0.96 0.972 Avg
Table 22. RIPPER rules for R2L 
   (C = telnet) and (E >= 4209) => AP=worm 
   (AL >= 0.51) and (A <= 26) => AP=ftp_write 
   (F >= 1829) and (U >= 1) => AP=xsnoop ………………………………………………..
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Table 23. Detailed accuracy for U2R 
Number of Rules 11
Correctly Classified Instances 97.5542%
Incorrectly Classified Instances 2.4458%
Time taken to build model 0.12 seconds
Table 24. Detailed accuracy for U2R 
TP Rate FP Rate Precision Recall FMeasure ROCArea Class
1 0.065 0.99 1 0.995 0.973 guess_passwd
0.55 0.004 0.688 0.55 0.611 0.882 buffer_overflow
0.97 0 1 0.97 0.985 0.973 httptunnel
0.667 0.006 0.556 0.667 0.606 0.842 ps
0 0.001 0 0 0 0.444 loadmodule
0.615 0.004 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.817 xterm
0.538 0.002 0.7 0.538 0.609 0.806 rootkit
0 0 0 0 0 0.739 sqlattack
0.976 0.056 0.972 0.976 0.973 0.965 Avg
Table 25. RIPPER rules for U2R 
(Q >= 3) and (A <= 2) => AP=sqlattack (2.0/0.0) 
(R >= 1) and (J <= 0) => AP=perl (2.0/0.0) 
(C = other) => AP=httptunnel (130.0/0.0) 
=> AP=guess_passwd (1234.0/3.0) 
………………………………………………..
Table 26. Confusion matrix for U2R 
A b c d e f g h i <-- classified as
1231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a = guess_passwd
3 11 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 b = buffer_overflow
0 1 129 2 0 0 1 0 0 c = httptunnel
2 2 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 d = ps
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 e = loadmodule
2 2 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 f = xterm
1 0 0 2 1 2 7 0 0 g = rootkit
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 h = perl
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i = sqlattack
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6. CONCLUSION
Many existing IDSs are still relying on manual 
entry of human expert; making IDSs are expen-
sive and ineffective. In this paper, we describe 
adaptively creating intrusion detection models. 
The benefit of the proposed Multi stage Rules is 
not only the higher accuracy but also improve 
scalability as when novel attacks of particular 
class are added to the dataset. Our learned rules 
are efficient to automatically detect attack in 
multistage. We generate several rules from data 
mining techniques that can apply to learn rules 
to detect known attacks, unknown attack and 
identify an attack grouped.
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